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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Galvan argued that the prosecutor violated both
Mr. Galvan's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by arguing that the jury could use
his post-Miranda 1 silence to infer evidence of his guile

This brief is necessary to

respond to the State's assertion that Mr. Galvan waived his right to remain silent when
he voluntary provided statements to the police. In response, Mr. Galvan argues that the
case law relied on by the State is distinguishable because the issue in those cases is
whether a criminal suspect sufficiently invoked the Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent as to require the police to terminate an interrogation. The State's authority does
not deal with Mr. Galvan's specific argument that the use of his post-Miranda silence as
evidence of his guilt violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Galvan's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Mr. Galvan did not object to the prosecutors statement at trial and raised this issue for
the first time on appeal under the fundamental error test set forth by the Idaho Supreme
Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (Idaho 2010)
1

2

1

ISSUES
1)

Did the prosecuting attorney violate Mr. Galvan's Fifth Amendment rights when,
without objection, he elicited testimony as to Mr. Galvan's post-arrest, postMiranda silence and commented on that silence in his closing argument?

2)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, for aggravated assault and the
deadly weapons enhancement and a concurrent sentence of four years, with one
and one-half years fixed, for stalking in the first degree?3

3 Mr. Galvan is not addressing this issue in this brief.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Galvan's Fifth Amendment Rights When, Without
Objection, He Elicited Testimony As To Mr. Galvan's Post-Arrest, Post-Miranda Silence
And Commented On That Silence In His Closing Argument
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Mr. Galvan failed to establish the
first prong of the fundamental error test pronounced in Perry, because Mr. Galvan
waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.) In

support of its assertion, the State relies on Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,

,

130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010), for the proposition that a criminal suspect must unambiguously
invoke the right to remain silent. While the State accurately states the holding from
Berghuis, the case is distinguishable because the question presented was whether

Thompkins' silence for a period of approximately three hours constituted a sufficient
means to invoke his Fifth Amendment right and required the police to stop the
interrogation. In other words, the case focused on the point in time when an
interrogation must cease.

According to the Berghuis Court that invocation must be

unambiguous because police officers need a clear indication that they cannot ask the
defendant any more questions.
However, Berghuis is not applicable in this case because Mr. Galvan is not
seeking the suppression of statements.

The question in this case is whether

Mr. Galvan's decision to not answer a question during an interrogation can be
subsequently used by the State during closing as evidence of his guilt. As stated in the
Appellant's Brief, (Appellant's Breif, pp.7-10), Mr. Galvan's primary argument relies on
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), where the United States Supreme Court held that

3

silence in the wake of the Miranda warnings "may be nothing more than the arrestee's
exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous
because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested." Id. at. 617. The
Doyle Court went on to hold that it would be "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of

due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used" against him/her at trial.
Id. at 618. As such, the Berghuis opinion is distinguishable from this case because
Berghuis stands for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent must

be unambiguously invoked, while the Doyle opinion stands for the proposition that postMiranda silence is inherently ambiguous and due to that ambiguity the Fourteenth

Amendment due process right to a fair trial would be violated if that silence was used
against the defendant.
The State also cites to Salinas v. Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2174 (2013), for the
proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination must be affirmatively invoked.
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However, that case dealt with non-custodial interrogation,
and the United State's Supreme Court expressly distinguished Salinas from Miranda
and its progeny on that basis. Id. at 2180.

In fact, the Salinas Court drew the very

same distinction argued by Mr. Galvan. In that case, Salinas argued for the Court to
adopt an exception to the Rule in Berghuis which requires a criminal defendant to
unambiguously invoke the Fifth Amendment right to silence.

The Salinas Court

employed the following rationale in rejecting that exception:
Petitioner's proposed exception would also be very difficult to
reconcile with Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176
L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010). There, we held in the closely related context of postMiranda silence that a defendant failed to invoke the privilege when he
refused to respond to police questioning for 2 hours and 45 minutes. 560
U.S., at - - , 130 S.Ct., at 2256-57, 2259-60. If the extended custodial
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silence in that case did not invoke the privilege, then surely the
momentary silence in this case did not do so either.
Petitioner and the dissent attempt to distinguish Berghuis by
observing that it did not concern the admissibility of the defendant's
silence but instead involved the admissibility of his subsequent
statements. But regardless of whether prosecutors seek to use silence or
a confession that follows, the logic of Berghuis applies with equal force: A
suspect who stands mute has not done enough to put police on notice that
he is relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege. FN3
FN3. Petitioner is correct that due process prohibits
prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was
silent after he heard Miranda warnings, Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 617-618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), but
that rule does not apply where a suspect has not received
the warnings' implicit promise that any silence will not be
used against him,[4J Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,240,
100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980).
Id. at 2182.

(citation omitted) (original emphasis).

According to the State's own

authority, the Berghuis opinion's requirement that a defendant unambiguously invoke
the right to remain silent is distinguishable from this case because that invocation
requirement deals with a direct Fifth Amendment violation and not the derivative
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation claimed by Mr. Galvan.
The State also argues that Mr. Galvan waived his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent when he began answering questions proffered by law enforcement.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6.)

Contrary to the State's position, the foregoing case law

does not require a defendant to affirmatively invoke the Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent in order for the defendant to argue that use of post-custody, post-Miranda silence
violated his/her Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. This position comports with

However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that, in Idaho, "a defendant's right to
remain silent attaches upon custody, not arrest or interrogation, and thus a prosecutor
may not use any post-custody silence to infer guilt in its case-in-chief." State v.
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011).
4

5

the Doyle holding which forbids the State's use of post-Miranda silence because it is
inherently ambiguous as to its meaning and it is, therefore, inherently unfair to use it to
infer guilt. While Mr. Galvan is not aware of any Idaho case law directly on pOint,5 the
Tenth Circuit has held that when a defendant answers some questions and refuses to
answer others, or in other words is partially silent, this "partial silence does not preclude
him from claiming a violation of his due process rights under Doyle."

U.S. v.

Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir. 1993). This is consistent with other Idaho

case law which precludes the use of silence at trial unless that State introduces it for the
limited purposes of impeachment. See Ellington, supra; See also State v. Dougherty,
142 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2005).
In sum, the State's authority is inapposite because it deals with the question of
whether a defendant sufficiently invoked the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent as
to require the police to cease an interrogation. Mr. Galvan is arguing that there is flat
prohibition against using a defendant's post-custody silence for the purpose of inferring
guilt based on a Fourteen Amendment due process claim which is derived from the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent.

5 According to the State, State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 524-525 (2002), stands for the
proposition "reinvocation of Miranda rights after waiver must be 'clear and ambiguous.'"
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) However, that case dealt with the questions of whether a
juvenile actually waived his right to silence and whether, after speaking with the police
on a few occasions, his mother's statement "the Miranda rights state he had a right to
[an attorney]," was an unambiguous request by his mother for an attorney. Id. Contrary
to the State's characterization of the holding in Doe, that case does not deal with the
question of whether a defendant's decision to refuse to answer a specific question
proffered by law enforcement after Miranda warnings can be subsequently introduced at
trial as evidence of guilt. If fact, Doe makes no reference to Doyle or due process
because it is a case dealing solely with the Fifth Amendment not a post-Miranda use of
silence due process issue. As such, the State's reliance on Doe is misplaced.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Galvan respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively,
Mr. Galvan respectfully requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portions of his
sentences.
DATED this 25 th day of September, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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